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ABSTRACT
Deliberative democracy as a form of citizen engagement and
social media as a means to achieving greater citizen engagement have both received considerable attention in recent years;
however, little attention has been paid to the way deliberative
democracy and social media function together. The central aim
of this research is to highlight the normative considerations surrounding social media in a deliberative democratic process. To
do this, the article uses Iris Marion Young’s model of deliberative
democracy that is rooted in inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and publicity. Applying this model’s normative values
to the use of audience response systems demonstrates that social
media have the capacity to fundamentally shift the normative
dimensions of deliberative democracy by changing the process
itself. The broad philosophical and social-theoretical concerns
related to the implications of social media for long-standing ontological and epistemological questions of achieving “the public
good” and structuring deliberative democratic processes underlie
this work.
The primary meaning of public is open and accessible. The public in
principle is not exclusionary. While general in that sense, this conception of a public does not imply homogeneity or the adoption of some
general or universal standpoint. Indeed, in open and accessible public
spaces and forums, one should expect to encounter and hear from those
who are different, whose social perspectives, experience, and affiliations are different.
—Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference
Administrative Theory & Praxis / September 2011, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 411–432.
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Deliberative democracy as a form of citizen engagement and social media as
a means to achieving greater citizen engagement have both received considerable attention in recent years; however, little attention has been paid to the way
deliberative democracy and social media function together. The central aim of
the article is to present and evaluate normative considerations for the use of
social media in deliberative democracy. Iris Marion Young’s (2002) model of
deliberative democracy serves as the basis of identifying normative values in
this research. Her model purports the normative concerns of inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and publicity. This work addresses the following
questions: Is the use of audience response systems (ARS) a legitimate means of
achieving the normative goals of a deliberative democracy? How can replacing
components of human deliberation with instant, digital feedback fundamentally
change the normative dimensions of a deliberative process? Can this trend to
incorporate more nonhuman artifacts in deliberative democracy be viewed as
an attempt to mask difference and, therefore, as a violation of value pluralism
or Young’s (1990) principle of communicating across difference?
To explore these questions, I present an overview of the significance and
basic aims of a deliberative democracy, detailing major trends in deliberative
democracy scholarship, particularly the way Young’s (1990) understanding
of difference and Spicer’s (2010) work on value pluralism further justify the
normative basis for a deliberative democratic process. Then, focusing on
Young’s (2002) model for deliberative democracy, I explain her four major
normative values. With this normative evaluation in mind, I move to the
second major trend this research explores, social media. New uses of social
media—in particular, ARS—have the potential to fufill the need of making
citizen engagement more accessible, but the unintended consequences of
this media can severely impede a deliberative process. Normative concerns
grounded in Young’s model guide the analysis of the use of ARS in deliberative democratic practice.
I argue that, ultimately, the normative focus of deliberative democracy must
remain not on the final outcome of the process, but on the process itself. The
way social media has taken on an increasingly integral role in defining the
deliberative process should be critically examined, because it has the potential
to drastically shape the nature of deliberation. Any decision or outcome as a
result of a particular decision arrived at through an unjust process, no matter how desirable the outcome may be, fails to uphold the intrinsic value of
deliberative democracy. The instrumental purpose of deliberative democracy
should not be ignored; yet, it should not be the fundamental concern. With the
use of social media, the deliberative democratic process should be designed to
allow for inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and publicity (Young
The author thanks Thomas Catlaw, Thomas Bryer, Staci Zavattaro, and three
anonymous reviewers for thoughtful feedback and guidance.
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2002). Applying the normative values of Young’s model to the use of ARS
demonstrates that new forms of social media have the capacity to fundamentally shift the focus of deliberative democracy. The broad philosophical and
social-theoretical concerns related to the implications of social media for longstanding ontological and epistemological questions of achieving “the public
good” and structuring deliberative democratic processes underlie this work.
The Significance of Deliberative
Democracy for Public Decision Making
Deliberative democracy is more than a means to making public decisions.
Considering the intrinsic value of a deliberative democratic system, it has the
potential to build positive relationships among citizens and achieve a social
justice goal of greater equality, access, and representation. King and Stivers
explain that the many citizen practices do not seek to achieve these larger goals:
“Citizenship tends to be equated with paying taxes and consuming benefits.
From this perspective, government uses up people’s money and gives them
back certain goods and services, a view that restricts possible relationships
between citizens and officials” (1998, p. 56). Not only does this “consumer
of benefits” understanding shift knowledge and power away from actual
citizens, but it limits the capacity and creativity in arriving at public decisions because these decisions are viewed primarily from the administrator’s
lens. Many scholars see a need for greater citizen participation and recognize
deliberation as the primary avenue for achieving such engagement (Barber,
1984; Bertolini, le Clercq, & Straatemeier, 2008; Bohman, 2000; Greczi,
2007; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996).
Within the deliberative process, the perspective and values a public administrator holds and employs to make decisions may be very different from
those of citizens affected by such decisions. Values play a key role in the
public decision-making process because these values are essential to individual
identities. However, a synthesis of individual values, or even a mere collection of these values for public decision making, demonstrates their breadth
and incompatibility. This raises the question, if individual values cannot be
collective in the sense of forming a single public good or public interest, how
should public decisions be made, or, more important, whose values should
public decisions be based on?
Value pluralism and “difference” embodied by competing perspectives
is essential to democratic practice rather than something to be overcome or
negated (Smith, 2003; Spicer, 2010; Young, 1989, 1990, 2002). Value pluralism in public administration should value difference in citizen identities and
perspectives that contribute to these multiple and often competing values at
work in a public space. Spicer states, “Put in its simplest terms, value pluralism is the idea that our moral values or conceptions of the good are many
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and varied and that we often find they come into conflict with one another in
ways that do not permit any easy reconciliation or solution” (2010, p. 18).
For public administrators, navigating these public spaces fraught with difference is challenging, especially when attempting to reduce domination and
subordination along the lines of group difference.
Attempts of administrative neutrality or a “view from nowhere” should be
considered suspect in a traditional system of governance. Miller and Fox do
not believe it is possible to give equal or neutral weight to competing value sets
given the traditional structure and practices of public administration: “Public
administrators, as objectified subjects, are both trapped in and productive of
the technologies of discipline, normalization, surveillance, individualization,
and pastoralism” (2007, p. 132). These systems of dominance are more or
less oppressive for particular forms of difference but, ultimately, cannot be
escaped even through attempts to create “fair” or “just” deliberative spaces
for competing groups. At best, valuing difference through acknowledgment
and representation in public decision-making processes is the most legitimate
means of working within the traditional administrative system. Bang and Sørensen (1999) presented the “everyday maker” as a way of bridging individual
and communal values and activity in public space.
At the heart of value pluralism is openness to voicing different perspectives and the willingness to recognize the “other.” Young (1990) believes that
this sort of acceptance can be an equalizing factor in public decision making.
Rethinking the way difference is treated to provide legitimate inclusion is essential to Young’s (1990) theory of achieving a just public decision-making
process. Likewise, Yuval-Davis’s (1997a, 1997b) work on difference is key for
understanding the complexity and barriers to meaningful public engagement
across differences. Yuval-Davis questions how to recognize group difference
(as socially constructed identities), while at the same time accounting for individual subjectivity. The tensions between intersectional identity and group
difference can pose significant challenges for the normative aim of recognizing
and communicating across difference in a deliberative process.
In her critical assessment of discursive silence, Patterson (2000b, pp.
668–670) uses gender as a lens for identifying group differences at work in
discursive settings. She states, “Gender (and other social distinctions) are
enacted and created, and gender relations constituted, through conventions of
talk and silence. . . . If conventional discursive practices are said to separate
the men from the boys, they seem content to figure women as ghosts” (p. 669).
This form of group difference translates into “othering” particular perspectives. Burnier took othering along gender lines further, and claims that “other
voices” translate into “other rooms,” or new spaces for discourse that can be
expansive in furthering the current discourse (2003, p. 529). Deliberation is
a championed as a vehicle for incorporating and valuing these marginalized
perspectives that Burnier (2003) and Patterson (2000a, 2000b) identify.
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A deliberative democracy is a plausible way of dealing with complex
identities and competing values at work in public spaces. Smith (2003, p.
55) contends that deliberative democracy should primarily focus on the
inclusive and legitimate process of decision making. This intrinsic value
of deliberative democracy is central to maintaining and promoting a public
that embraces differences in decision making. By engaging citizens with
different identities and values, the conversation should move beyond mere
stereotypes or characterizations of public issues and identify the inherent
tensions or substantive questions necessary for public decision making
from each subjective standpoint. Key conditions must be met to achieve
this level of deliberation. The public space that deliberative democracy
provides should embrace and value each participant’s perspectives and
values equally and inclusively. Patterson argues, “If discourse is essential
to coming to a fuller understanding of who we are, what our situation is,
what we should do, and why we should do it, that discourse necessitates
the inclusion of every willing and attending voice” (2000a, p. 246). To
understand how a legitimate deliberative democratic process is possible,
I examine major trends in the deliberative democracy literature, focusing
primarily on those theories that champion differences as a central factor
in deliberative democracy.
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) trace the concept of a deliberative democracy back to Aristotelian tradition. However, the first use of the actual
term deliberative democracy was in Bessette’s (1980) writing on the U.S.
Constitution. Elstub (2010) places deliberative democracy scholarship into
three generations. First-generation deliberative democracy scholars Habermas and Rehg (1998) and Rawls (1995), for example, focus on the form of
communication, exchange of reason, and goal of consensus, while failing to
account for social complexities (Elstub, 2010, p. 291). Second-generation
deliberative democracy scholars focus on the omission of social complexity
by the first-generation scholars and address this in the process of deliberation
itself. Examples of key second-generation deliberative democracy scholars
are Gutmann and Thompson (1996) and Bohman (2000). Third-generation
deliberative democracy scholars focus primarily on practical models for enacting a deliberative process in a given institutional context; examples include
Ackerman and Fishkin (2004), Baber and Bartlett (2005), O’Flynn (2006),
Parkinson (2006), and Ryfe (2002).
Because the purpose of this work is focused on the normative concerns that
surround deliberative democracy, I target specifically those whom Elstub calls
“difference democrats,” because they “accept that the model of deliberative
democracy is formally inclusive in the sense that it seeks the participation of all,
but claim that it is not substantially inclusive because the complete dependence
on rational forms of communication privilege dominant social groups” (2010,
p. 297). These foci lead second-generation, or difference theorists, to prize
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the value pluralist perspective previously outlined and advocate for multiple
and, at times, competing forms of communication by different social groups
who have a stake in the decision-making process. For these reasons, I rely
on one model in particular, that of Iris Marion Young (2002), which I explain
in the following section and then apply to a new form of social media being
used in deliberative democratic processes, ARS.
Deliberative Democratic Model:
Young’s Valuation of Difference
Within what Elstub (2010) identifies as the second generation of “difference”
deliberative theorists, Young (2002) provides an overview of the very basic
components involved in any deliberative democratic model. First, there is
some element of practical reasoning in that competing proposals for solving
public problems with justifications that support such proposals are put forth
by individuals or groups. Persuasion is used to get support for ideas, and the
democratic process involves a discussion to evaluate the public problems,
conflicts, and claims of interest being presented. Through dialogue, ideas can
be tested and challenged until the deliberating public arrives at some decision.
Decisions can be determined by what preferences have the highest level of
numerical support or by the collective public determining that a decision is
best based on the strongest support voiced in favor of a particular proposal
(Young, 2002, pp. 22–23). This basic model that Young proposed entails the
following normative ideals for deliberating parties: inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and publicity.1
Inclusion
Within this model, inclusion is a necessary condition for a legitimate process
of discussion and decision making. The question becomes, what does inclusion
mean, or what extent of inclusion is legitimate? Young (2002) contends that
those affected by the decision must be included in the decision-making process
or it is not legitimate. This argument naturally leads to the next question of what
level of “affect” one must experience. She states, “We can say that ‘affected’
here means at least that decisions and policies significantly condition a person’s
options for action. As an ideal, inclusion embodies a norm of moral respect”
(p. 23). Respect is central to the element of inclusion, because Young sees
not including an individual and then, in turn, requiring behavior to comport
with the decision that they had no ability to voice interests in determining is
treating individuals as a means (p. 23). Inclusion, when combined with the
other three elements of Young’s model, allows for the greatest potential for
individuals to express interest, opinions, and perspectives pertinent to achieving public ends (p. 23).
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Political Equality
Not only is inclusion necessary, but inclusion on equal terms is also needed
for a democratic process, according to Young (2002, p. 23). She argues, “All
ought to have equal effective opportunity to question one another, and to
respond to and criticize one another’s proposals and arguments” (p. 23). This
freedom to engage in deliberation through discursive exchange is a central
normative ideal in Young’s model. This entails freedom from domination or
coercion and threats from others to influence the proposals and outcomes
being presented in the public decision-making process.
Reasonableness
In Young’s model, reasonableness focuses more on “a set of dispositions that
discussion participants have than on the substance of people’s contributions to
the debate” (2002, p. 24). By this model, being reasonable means a capacity
to listen to others and propensity to accept critiques of one’s own position.
Conversely, some participants in the deliberative process may dismiss others
by labeling their ideas or proposals irrational, incorrect, or inappropriate for
solving public problems, and this sort of behavior is unreasonable, according
to Young. I see Young’s component of reasonableness as not only having a
rational dimension to the types of deliberation one is willing to engage in but
also having a subjective empathy toward others’ perspective that may, in fact,
be radically different from one’s own perspective or values. A key underlying
principle of reasonableness is the rationale for entering a deliberative process,
namely, that individuals should enter into deliberation with the aim of reaching
agreement. Although agreement or consensus (unlike the first generation of
deliberative democracy thought) is not always possible or desirable in practice,
this basic motivation for discussion allows room for knowledge sharing to take
place when dissent and justifications of difference are presented and taken
seriously by participants. This notion is significant in Young’s model because,
as she explains, “only if the participants believe they in good faith trust one
another to listen and aim to persuade one another” (p. 24). Reasonableness
requires a certain level of cognitive flexibility in what one is willing to accept and be persuaded of by the justifications for others’ views and values.
A deliberative process must provide space for individuals to recognize that
their subjective values and preferences are not the single, correct, or objective
standpoint from which to approach a public problem.
Publicity
The culmination of the inclusion, equality, and reasonableness previously
detailed in settings in which individuals hold one another accountable forms
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a public, according to Young’s (2002) model. This understanding is marked by
the value of difference: “A public consists of a plurality of different individual
and collective experiences, histories, commitments, ideals, interests, and goals
that face one another to discuss collective problems under a common set of
procedures” (p. 25). These differences being voiced in a public space require
individuals to consider the discursive terms and narratives used to present
their own subjective experience and standpoint on public issues. The values
and interests of each individual must be expressed in a way that makes them
understandable and compelling to others with dissimilar perspectives. Like the
goal of agreement explained in terms of reasonableness, the aim is for each
individual’s position to be understandable and acceptable, but this agreement
does not entail that all positions be accepted by all other participants in the
deliberative process.
Now that the ideal normative values of Young’s (2002) model of deliberative democracy have been explicated, I will apply these values to a growing
trend in deliberative democracy—the use of ARS. But before proceeding, I
provide an overview of major trends, uses, and debates surrounding normative
and practical applications of social media beyond the context of deliberative
democracy. Schooley explains, “Many scholars and practitioners are calling for
either more usage of succesful tehniques to increase citizen participation or new,
innovative ways to engage the citizenry because of the shortcomings they have
found with current appraoches” (2008, p. 246). In light of the allure of social
media for improving citizen engagement, social media should be considered
and critically examined as a means for achieving such larger goals.
Social Media in Public Decision Making
When evaluating social media as a tool for contributing to the deliberative
democratic process, the first question that arises is, what constitutes social
media? Numerous definitions of social media exist, but for the purposes of
this work, I use the U.S. Federal Web Managers Council’s definition of social
media as the various activities that integrate technology, social interaction,
and content creation (www.howto.gov/social-media/social-media-types/).
These characteristics of integrating technology, social interaction, and content
creation provide for a more expansive understanding of social media than
what is commonly a term reserved for technologies and practices in a casual
or collegial space. In common parlance, for many social media has come to
mean Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, blogging, and YouTube.
By the U.S. Federal Web Managers Council’s definition, social has an
interactive or communal connotation rather than the commonly understood
informal or entrainment meaning. From this definition, information sharing
and content creation can take place with the use of a wider variety of technologies, so long as there are multiple users interacting to create content.
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Additional forms of social media that share these basic characteristics include
wikis, discussion forums, e-government, and ARS.
I selected ARS as a form of social media to analyze in Young’s (2002) deliberative democracy model for several reasons. First, ARS has been adopted
in many deliberative democratic processes. Second, ARS has the capability to
be utilized in both face-to-face and Web-based deliberative processes. Also,
ARS is becoming an increasingly popular tool for addressing public problems,
especially planning efforts at the local level and large-scale efforts that span
multiple localities, states, and regions. Finally, very little scholarship addresses
the use of ARS by public officials. Instead, scholarly works on ARS appears
primarily in educational research on ARS in classroom settings or in medical
fields for learning and clinical trials.
Consistent with the U.S. Federal Web Managers Council’s definition, an
ARS is a social medium in the contemporary sense because it integrates technology in the form of touchpads and computer software to generate responses.
The ARS data collected from the touchpad voting constitute content creation.
Finally, ARS involves social engagement in face-to-face deliberative settings
when multiple participants interact with one another and public officials through
presentations, discussions, questions, and deliberation that are integrated into
the ARS system for participant voting. Remote social interaction through ARS
is still in development, but ARS will have the capability for participants to log
in to a virtual “space” and engage with other participants and public officials in
these same ways online as well. As a tool for deliberative processes, ARS currently has the potential to engage a community of users in face-to-face settings
by contributing to the instrumental function of deliberative democracy or arriving
at a public decision. The social dimension of ARS facilitates the deliberative
process through engagement of multiple users at different stages of this public
decision-making process by providing clear representations of participant
preference, which can then facilitate more engagement or deliberation. Keske
and Smutko explain that in their study, ARS technology was used to “facilitate
more efficient information exchange among citizen stakeholders and promote
critical thinking and dialogue” (2010, p. 952).
Considering the scholarship on social media in public administration more
broadly, major trends in the social media literature that have been examined
for their utility beyond knowledge sharing; specifically, for more formal uses
in citizen engagement and public decision-making, including the umbrella of
Web 2.0 and specific tools like wikis and the social networks of Facebook,
MySpace, Twitter, and blogs (Brainard & McNutt, 2010; Mergel, 2010;
Noveck, 2009; Thorne & Kouzmin, 2008). Although there is potential for
increased citizen engagement and efficiency in the process of reaching citizens (Austin & Callen, 2008), critiques of democratic practices within these
technologies have been prevalent (Austin & Callen, 2008; Felts, 2008; Saco,
2002; Scott, 2006; van den Hoven, 2005).
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The democratic promises of social media are primarily centered around two
key elements: dissemination of knowledge and new forms of participation that
allow for greater inclusion and access to public decision making (Felts, 2008,
p. 296). The instrumental benefit that social media can serve—facilitating the
process of achieving more knowledge sharing and engaging more participants
in citizen–public official collaboration, is likewise appealing (Brainard &
McNutt, 2010). Keske & Smutko see increasing efficiency and stakeholder
satisfaction with the use of social media (in their case, ARS) when participants
reveal their preferences anonymously, which, in turn, enables stakeholders to
engage collectively. They believed that “the instant feedback provided by ARS
also allows for simultaneous information transfers from all in attendance and
stimulates discussion about the results of the instantaneous polling” (2010,
p. 954). Similarly, Austin and Callen identify a central benefit of the Internet
and the government’s use of technologies as a way to improve performance,
efficiency, access, accountability, and civic engagement (2008, pp. 324–325).
Yet, despite these promises of social media for greater connectivity and enhanced processes, Felts reminds us: “To not associate media with power is
naïve. Like all technologies, they are not neutral” (2008, p. 296).
The major criticisms of social media raise serious concerns for reifying
existing systems of dominance while continuing to silence marginalized
perspectives through implicit structures of technologies or “digital divide”
concerns (Austin & Callen, 2008; Couldry, 2003; Felts, 2008; Thorne &
Kouzmin, 2008). Remote access and citizens engaging in cyberspace is
challenged by scholars in multiple ways. Saco presents a critical analysis of
the social production of space in terms of technology, or “cyberspace”; and
politics, or American “democracy”; and body, or “citizen” (2002, p. xvii).
Saco underscores Foucault’s understanding of “heterotopia,” which acts as
a “disturbing” or “in-between” space of “otherness” in which our typically
discursive practices cannot account for the objects of actions taking place
within this realm of cyberspace (pp. 13–16). Consistent with Saco’s critique,
Thorne and Kouzmin call for public administration discourse to “interrogate
and engage in the continuum between physical space and cyberspace” to
avoid exploitation and heightened vulnerability (2008, pp. 314–315). Austin
and Callen (2008) see the dangers of democratic participation through social
media becoming devastating in the sense that subjects are objectified when
serving as tools of the process itself.
Few social media studies speak to or are at least applicable to the use
of ARS. The most similar form of social media is online deliberation, but,
surprisingly, few scholars (Capella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Iyengar, Luskin,
& Fishkin, 2003; Lowry, 2009; Price & Cappella, 2002; Price et al., 2003;
Traugott, 1992) study social media in the form of online deliberation. Lowry’s
(2009, p. 39) study, for example, focused on a transportation planning process
that was conducted through online postings by participants. To evaluate the
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process of online deliberation, Lowry performed a binomial regression to
determine which participant characteristics were associated with higher rates
of posting (p. 47). This illustration is one example of the more quantitative
approaches that are commonly employed to examine deliberation when new
social media tools are introduced into the process. This quantitative lens is
important for answering more practical questions concerning the application
and instrumental evaluation of social media, but it does not address the normative concerns that I target in this work. No research to date questions how
social media can potentially change the nature of deliberative democracy by
changing the tools used in the deliberative process. This research contributes
to this area of scholarship by addressing the normative concerns surrounding
social media in a deliberative process.
ARS and Dynamics of Deliberation
With the exception of two articles, no scholarship on ARS and public decision
making exists. The first work is a description of ARS and ARS strategies for
face-to-face public meetings (Kobak, 2010). The second is a case study of a
land use decision-making process using ARS in a local community (Keske
& Smutko, 2010). Kobak explains the nature and basic function of an ARS
system: “ARS is instant polling software used in conjunction with a slide
presentation. A USB receiver/base station retrieves the data provided by an
audience using wireless hand-held devices and stores this information on the
presenter’s computer” (2010, p. 1). The logistical realities (time, physical proximity of participants, notification, call to participate, meeting space, artifacts,
interpersonal interactions) and implicit power dynamics in public spaces for
deliberative democracy are central considerations for a deliberative process.
In response to some of these logistical considerations, ARS is also capable of
operating by cell phone and personal computers in remote locations, which can
solve some challenges for citizens unable to access public decision making
in real space and time. One major producer of ARS, Turning Technologies,
conducted the largest remote polling event to date, with approximately 10,000
attendees in three different locations in 2008 (Turning Technologies, 2008).
From this example of Web-based participation, the practical utility of ARS
is evident, and the use of this form of social media will likely increase in the
future. In their study of face-to-face use of Turning Technologies’ ARS in two
rural counties of Colorado, Keske and Smutko’s (2010) goal of quantifying
community support for competing land use proposals was achieved. What
was not addressed in this study was the deliberative aspect of the process or
if such a dimension was present.
ARS has the capability to contribute to the larger trend of making citizens
more engaged by making participation more accessible for different citizen
groups; it brings together a range of people from diverse backgrounds with
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different perspectives who espouse competing values across space and time.
Kobak highlights efficiency as a major benefit of this form of social media as
well: “The most obvious benefit of ARS is the chance to receive instant and
accurate feedback from the audience. This feedback is assumed to represent
honest opinions because the answers are sent anonymously” (2010, p. 2).
Another key capability of ARS is that from these digital responses, reports
can be generated detailing not only the results of voting but also participant
information, such as demographic data that can be analyzed to determine the
way certain groups were represented and how this group representation was
reflected in participant voting behavior. In light of these claimed benefits, a
critical evaluation should be undertaken to consider the normative dimensions
of ARS in deliberative democracy.
Application of Young’s Model
to Audience Response Systems
Inclusion
Young (2002) contends that those affected by a public decision must be
included in the decision-making process or it is not legitimate. ARS has the
ability to both promote and constrain inclusion. Returning to the democratic
promises of social media, when used in face-to-face public meetings, ARS can
satisfy the goal of dissemating knowledge in the readily available feedback of
all willing participants. ARS provides a means for each individual to engage in
public decision making equally and anonymously at public meetings (again,
face-to-face and virtual space). For those participants in remote-access settings, ARS can be more inclusive in that it allows all individuals with remote
access to participate it they had not been able to be present in a face-to-face
setting. At the same time, challenges like the digital divide make the mediated participation with remote access even more severe for those without
Internet or cellular service, training, or familiarity with the ARS system and
additional technological knowledge. Furthermore, ARS can potentially limit
the willingness and ability of citizens to actively voice preferences and differences in values within these public spaces if too much emphasis is placed
on the data presented and the efficency of the process, while discrediting the
act of deliberation itself. This process can potentially result in what Austin
and Callen (2008) warned against: participants being objectified when serving as tools of the process. The question becomes, what end does the data ARS
provides serve? Farmer warned against championing efficiency: “Efficiency’s
rhetorical mass exceeds the weight of its rational support in that efficiency as a
concept is, for instance, artificial and arbitrary. . . . Practitioners often notice
that what cannot be counted tends to be excluded from cost-benefit analysis”
(2005, p. 181). If the ability of different individuals and competing groups to
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voice their position in public spaces (either face-to-face or cyberspace) only
constitutes an anonymous vote, then ARS does not promote inclusion in a
deliberative process by Young’s defintion. Table 1 summarizes the potential
benefits and challenges that ARS poses for the normative ideals of inclusion
as well as political equality, reasonableness, and publicity.
The use of ARS in no way ensures that oral presentation, disagreement,
or evaluation is incorporated by this form of social media, leaving room for
the major cirticisms of social media to come into play with the use of ARS.
A significant question raised by this form of social media is whether using a
touchpad to reflect individual preference legitimately addresses differences
in perspectives and public values and entails inclusions, or, alternatively, if
this promotes discursive silences, in Patterson’s terms (2000b). ARS has the
potential to weaken the deliberation that takes place in public spaces, making the form of inculsion ARS provides a mere data collection with little or
no deliberative means to contribute to the process itself, which, in turn, can
merely reify the current power dynamics at work.
Political Equality
Young’s (2002, p. 23) normative ideal of political equality involves the space
to question one another and to respond to and counter one another’s proposals
and arguments. This ideal speaks to the democratic benefits espoused in favor
of social media; however, ARS as a tool in the deliberative process does not
contribute to meeting the democratic benefits. Instead, ARS can, as Keske
and Smutko (2010) explain, achieve the instrumental benefit of increasing
efficiency and stakeholder satisfaction. Neither face-to-face nor remote access ARS systems fully comport with Young’s notion of political equality. In
her earlier work, Young (1990) argues that justice in a group-differentiated
society requires social equality of all groups, and a mutual understanding
and affirmation of group differences by actively voicing different social
perspectives. “Attending to group-specific needs and providing for group
representation both promotes that social equality and provides the recognition that undermines cultural imperialism” (Young, 1990, p. 191). Attempts
to minimize difference will result in unfair and unrepresentative practices of
public deliberation.
From the basic operation of the ARS system, ARS has the potential to
serve as a tool for masking difference, especially if the context and norms
surrounding the ARS system are not conducive to unconstrained dialogue
in which perspectives are challenged. The individuals putting the ARS
presentation together and conducting the meeting hold a privileged position in that they set the discursive terms and available proposals presented
to participants. Remote access is even more challenged in satisfying this
normative ideal, because the exchange of dialogue is less likely given the

Political equality

Inclusion

Young’s (2002) components of
deliberative democracy
For those in the public space of decision-making,
ARS can be more inclusive in that it allows all
individuals to participate in systematic way and
encourages some individuals to voice preference in
a face-to-face setting that would not have done so
in the absence of anonymity.
Conversely, the mediated participation via the
“clicker” can mute important perspectives and
values that are not captured by the parameters of
the ARS system or the presentation designed and
executed through the ARS.
Achieving political equality using ARS is extremely challenging, because this ideal involves discussion and deliberation in the absence of dominance.
The context and norms surrounding the ARS
system may not be conducive to unconstrained
dialogue in which perspectives are challenged and
deliberation is encouraged. The individuals putting
the ARS presentation together and conducting the
meeting hold a privileged position in that they set
the discursive terms and available proposals.

Face-to-face ARS

Achieving political equality using ARS in remote
settings is even more difficult than face-to-face
interactions. As this technology is developed,
discussion and deliberation in the absence of dominance will be difficult to promote and achieve via
remote voting because the “space” or cyber politics
can be intimidating and not conducive to exchange
of dialogue, prompting scripted, guarded, or no
responses to others at all. Also, the digital divide
concerns are relevant for political equality.

For those in cyberspace, ARS can be more inclusive in that it allows all individuals with remote
access to participate that may not have been able
to be present in a face-to-face setting.
At the same time, challenges like the digital
divide make the mediated participation via
remote access even more severe for those without
Internet or cellular service, training, or familiarity
with the ARS system and additional technological knowledge.

Remote ARS

Table 1. Summary of Normative Values of Audience Response Systems (ARS) in Face-to-Face and Remote Access Uses
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Publicity

Reasonableness

ARS has the potential to diminish the value of
reasonableness, which requires a certain level of
cognitive flexibility in what one is willing to accept
and be persuaded of by others. As a tool for collecting data rather than encouraging deliberation,
ARS may not promote the ideal of reasonableness.
This process allows for more consensus building
and persuasive power in the hands on the public official constructing and enacting the ARS presentation.
ARS alone is unable to capture the terms and narratives used to present one’s own subjective experience and standpoint on public issues. For publicity
to be satisfied, the values and interests of each
individual must be expressed in a way that makes
them understandable and compelling to others
with dissimilar perspectives. ARS can be used as a
tool for facilitating deliberation, but this is highly
dependent on the terms the public official sets.
Consistent with the difficulties outlined in reasonableness section above, remote access ARS does
not allow for the expression of individual perspectives to be voiced and evaluated by a public at this
time. In the future, a major concern surrounding
cyberspace publicity is the way individuals will
feel compelled to present their positions in cyberspace.

Remote access ARS compounds the problems of
reasonableness, because in its current form, there
is no interactive dialogue built into the ARS system
among participants taking place. This model
eliminates citizens from voicing, persuading, and
rethinking ideas with one another. As this feature
develops in the future, the concerns surrounding
cyber politics will likely shape this form of discursive interaction.
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current design of ARS technology, and, again, challenges of the digital
divide remain.
Reasonableness
According to Young’s model (2002), being reasonable means having a capacity
to listen to others and a propensity to accept critiques of one’s own position
(see Table 1 for benefits and challenges). Although ARS creates a system for
participants to indicate their opinion equally (one vote per participant) and
confidentially, this set-up alone is not open dialogue or communicative in
character. ARS has the potential to hinder the deliberative democratic process
by diminishing reasonableness through less deliberation if more attention is
given to the results of collective voting. However, as a tool for collecting data
based on individual preferences to determine the public interest, Keske and
Smutko (2010) contend that ARS can encourage reasonableness in engaged
discussion or deliberation if participants use the results as a starting point for
deliberation.
A key caution is to guard against data being used to promote consensus
building and persuasive power in the hands of the public official constructing and enacting the ARS presentation. Geczi explains that a deliberative
process is not meant to uncover or arrive at the “public interest” or “common
good” (2007, p. 387). Like Young (1990, 2002), Geczi argues that “the ideas
of the ‘public interest’ and ‘public good’ are problematic in a deeply stratified society, for they tend to reflect the worldview of the dominant groups in
seemingly apolitical terms” (pp. 387–388). To avoid this singular ideal of the
decision-making process, “public involvement arrangements should use social
difference as a resource and encourage the participants to communicate their
diverse experiences to each other. In this manner, a democratic process can
challenge the dominant discourses circulating in the public sphere” (Geczi,
2007, p. 388). Interestingly, Kobak (2010, p. 2) argues that the anonymity
involved in ARS voting is major benefit of this social media; however, difference theorists like Greczi (2007) and Young (2002) sees this as a violation
of communicating across difference.
Publicity
Young’s (2002) normative ideal of publicity entails that the values and interests
of each individual be expressed in a way that makes them understandable and
compelling to others with dissimilar perspectives. Like the ideals of reasonableness, the aim is for each individual’s position to be understandable and
acceptable, but this goal does not necessitate that all positions be accepted
by all other participants in the deliberative process. A major strength of an
ARS is its capability to bring in multiple participants across space and time,
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satisfying the promise of social media for greater inclusion (see Table 1 for
benefits and challenges). As demonstrated in the remote access example previously discussed, numerous people in various contexts can utilize this system
over space and time (assuming, of course, knowledge of and ability to use this
form of technology correctly). The use of ARS helps to connect participants to
public space, making inclusion the component of Young’s (2002) model that
is upheld in the most legitimate form. However, the goal of publicity is the
most difficult normative ideal for ARS to meet. Remote access cyberspace is
challenged by scholars in multiple ways, especially in terms of Saco’s (2002)
“heterotopia,” which warns against othering citizens in this virtual space. It
is unlikely that ARS is able to capture the terms and narratives used to present one’s own subjective experience and standpoint on public issues. For
publicity to be satisfied, the values and interests of each individual must be
expressed in a way that makes them understandable and compelling to others
with dissimilar perspectives. This goal cannot be accomplished through the
ARS system alone, and normative and practical questions surrounding how
much emphasis is placed on ARS versus deliberative expression in face-toface settings remain.
Conclusion
With the crucial goal of achieving greater citizen engagement at the forefront
of public administration, deliberative democracy and social media are significant in the scholarship and practice that contribute to meeting this goal. This
work adds to the existing literature by presenting and evaluating normative
dimensions of using social media in deliberative democracy. In tracing major
trends in deliberative democracy scholarship to present the normative concerns
for a deliberative democratic process, I focused specifically on the theoretical
basis of difference within value pluralism and the inclusion of the other. I used
Young’s (2002) model of deliberative democracy as the basis for identifying the normative values of inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and
publicity. Finally, I analyzed the potential for ARS to shape the normative
goals of a deliberative democratic practice.
This work does not explicitly address the questions and prospects of thirdgeneration deliberative democracy scholars focused on practice; however,
some ways to extend this normative assessment into third-generation scholarship would be by exploring the following questions: What types of decision
making, issues, and institutional conditions would be most conducive for
the use of social media, or ARS specifically? How can additional forms of
social media positively contribute to increasing inclusion, political equality,
reasonableness, and publicity for previously excluded groups? Can ARS or
other forms of social media be utilized to enhance the deliberative process
at phases of the decision-making process other than deliberation (e.g., infor-
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mation sharing predeliberation, or possibly follow-up acknowledgments and
updates postdeliberation)? Finally, are certain types of decisions and contexts
more conducive to the use of ARS?
When questioning the democratic promises of ARS and social media, more
generally, ARS has the potential to satisfy the two goals of disseminating
knowledge and providing an avenue for new forms of citizen participation.
However, questions arise when evaluating just how inclusive and accessible
ARS is in both face-to-face and remote settings. ARS as a tool for collecting and presenting group values and perspectives in a given context can be
efficient and effective in achieving the instrumental goal of social media
that Austin and Callen (2008), Brainard and McNutt (2010), and Keske and
Smutko (2010) identify. Yet, despite these promises of social media for greater
facilitation of enhanced processes, ARS, like many other forms of social
media, falls victim to normative criticisms waged at the use of social media
in public decision making.
Consistent with commonly waged critiques of social media, a potential
shortcoming of the use of ARS is its propensity to reify existing systems of
dominance while continuing to silence marginalized perspectives through
implicit structures of technologies or the digital divide. As Patterson points
out, “Silence is itself a discourse, rather than an absence” (2000b, p. 680).
Yet, with the use of ARS, discursive silences are likely to be symptomatic of
dominance and oppression at work for marginalized groups’ perspectives, as
Austin and Callen (2008), Couldry (2003), and Thorne and Kouzmin (2008)
argue. Not only can cyberspace serve as an oppressive force, but also citizens
who participate using ARS (both face-to-face and in cyberspace) can become
tools in the process themselves. Agamben (1998, 2005) focuses on the way
knowledge and power are intertwined in discourses of privilege for particular
groups. This power dynamic can occur and be exacerbated with the use of
social media that lend to a more instrumental focus, while at the same time
move away the intrinsic goals of the deliberative process.
The analysis of ARS in light of Young’s (2002) specific normative ideals
of inclusion, political equality, reasonableness, and publicity presents several
considerations for coming closer to her normative ideals that are worth noting.
Close attention should be paid to the intrinsic values of difference and the
other in voicing perspectives within the decision-making process. This goal
can be achieved through the critical examination of deliberative space and
deliberative absence (both real and virtual). Patterson (2000b) and Burnier
(2003) highlight the need for this sort of examination in gendered terms. This
willingness to adopt social media as tools in deliberative processes should
be viewed with caution, because these practices have the potential to mask
difference in an attempt to achieve greater expediency and consensus. This
can be done by focusing on the discourse to eliminate the guise of objectivity,
which often results in devaluing difference.
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Farmer describes the need for this subjective examination and identification:
Each and every human explanation and understanding is from within
one perspective or a set of perspectives. We have no nonperspectival, no
godlike, vantage point. Or to put it another way, each and every scientific
hermeneutic proposition is made from within a particular discourse or
language. (2005, p. 63)
To avoid violating the most fundamental components of deliberative democracy, the intrinsic value of the process itself must remain central. Ultimately, any
device, or form of social media, used to increase the efficiency or instrumental
purpose of a public decision-making process should be critiqued, and the
potential consequences should be weighed against the intrinsic value of such
a process. Greater participation or more efficient citizen engagement should
not negate the normative legitimacy of a deliberative democratic process.
Note
1. Publicity and accountability are the central components of Gutmann and
Thompson’s (1996) understanding of deliberation.
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